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LEARNING THE LAW-THOUGHTS TOWARD A
HUMAN PERSPECTIVE*
Robert S. Redmount** and Thomas L. Shaffer "**
The history of American legal education is notable for a sparsity of ideas on
how to convey learning about law. There has been even less focal understanding
of what learning is and what it takes to establish a process which will prepare
lawyers for their profession. A window on this history was provided in historical
survey by Alfred Z. Reed in 1921 and, more recently, by Professors Preble Stolz
and Calvin Woodward.**** It is principally their accounts of eighteenth and
nineteenth century developments that we here briefly integrate and summarize.
The perspective-a consideration of legal education in terms of social change
and, especially, educational theory and practice-is, of course, our own.
I. American Legal Education Before 1870
In the Spartan society of early nineteenth century America the stem business of personal, social, and political survival left little possibility for thought and
the cultivation of institutions of professional education. America had a number
of aging, English-trained barristers, but it had none of the developed traditions
of the Inns of Court in Britain for the training of lawyers in Anglo-Saxon law. It
did, of course, have Blackstone's Commentaries,but that provided an assemblage
of law; Blackstone did not address the means for the dissemination and learning
of law.
In understandably homespun fashion, and following a procedural tradition
of medieval craftsmen, one sought to learn law by going to the well of the lawyer.
This was the lawyer's office. Here one sat and "read" the law. In effect, the
neophyte served an apprenticeship. He observed what the lawyer did, learned
when instructed to "look up" the law, and carried out some of the more perfunctory or mechanical operations of lawyering assigned to him by his mentor.
After a decent interval of reading the law he could proclaim himself a lawyer
or qualify for certification if his state provided certification. This was perhaps
the truest instance of "learning by doing" or, more accurately, learning by imitation, in the history of American legal education. It meant learning good as well
as bad practice; learning was mostly self-taught, copying from whatever model
was available. There was clearly no consciousness of a formal educational
process, and little sense of teaching or learning.
*
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Judge Tapping Reeve, an enterprising law practitioner in Litchfield, Connecticut, recognized the benefits and the patronage to be gained from congregating students of law in one place and giving them group instruction. He founded
what is claimed as the first American law school in a small backyard building
next to his home in Litchfield in the 1780's. The Litchfield School prospered
for several decades, mostly on the strength of the monopoly of instructional
material that Reeve carefully nurtured. He prepared a system of lectures about
the law, much in the manner of Blackstone's treatise, and was careful not to
publish or freely disseminate them. His daily lectures, student notetaking, and
examinations were combined with practical experience to form the first systematic approach to legal education in the United States. Here for the first time
one finds the virtue of economy in learning the law. Reeve demonstrated that
many could be taught simultaneously with a minimum expenditure of time,
money, and energy. This economy became a buttress and a curse to Reeve's
descendants; it is a hallmark of American legal education which has survived
into the late twentieth century and which entraps its potential for growth and
initiative in learning.
By the middle of the nineteenth century two discernible philosophies about
legal education had developed in this country, both of them associated with universities which had begun programs in lawyer-training before 1820. One, closest
to the daily pragmatism of living that characterized the economic and social life
of New England and the middle Atlantic states, was epitomized by the education (training) offered at Harvard University. It took into acount its provincial
competitor, a flourishing system of law office apprenticeship. Harvard University
lent its name and its facility for legal education, but there was little requirement
of general or university scholarship. The proper education of a lawyer was to be
vocational, though not narrowly vocational. It was to prepare him, though not
in all its practical detail, for the practice of law. A discrete professional school of
law had been established. One needed to learn the common law and judicial
decisions. There was no serious attempt to look at law as an intellectual discipline-no attempt to transplant the European-university tradition in law.
Law at Harvard was divisible in terms of traditional Blackstonian subjects, and,
as at Litchfield, lecture was the conventional mode of instruction. There was
then no unifying principle of study and no analytical system to reduce the mass
of decision. Law learning was a busy enterprise-busier, perhaps, then it needed
to be-since there was so much detail to learn. It remains, today, a busy enterprise.
The second educational philosophy of legal education bore the mark of the
country squire from Virginia, Thomas Jefferson: it was the "southern strategy."
It reflected the intellectual cultivation of gentlemen in the Roman tradition.
Law, as an aspect of culture and learning, was to be comprehended as an intellectual pursuit; its substance was, essentially, philosophy, politics and rhetoric.
Jefferson was, in this as in most of what he did, influenced by Europe. At the
University of Virginia and, subsequently, at other like-minded, mostly Southern
schools, law became a learned pursuit, with the accent on "learned." Preparation was that of a gentleman who might become a politician, legislator, or states-
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man, as well as or instead of a lawyer. Professorial chairs were assigned with
incumbents to lecture on such subjects as "Moral Philosophy and the Law of
Nature and of Nations," "Political Economy and Government," "Ethics and
Moral Science," and "Law and Politics." A blend of the practical and the
theoretical in subject matter was encouraged as legal education became, or
remained, allied to a more general university education.

II. The Langdell Experience
The alternative and competing philosophies were exemplars of "not seeing
the forest for the trees" (Harvard), on the one hand, and "not seeing the trees for
the forest" (Virginia), on the other. Both were ultimately consumed by a new
Harvard approach as the mass of legal decision put more stress on the necessity
and feasibility of a parochial mastery of the law. In 1871, Christopher Columbus
Langdell, Dean of the Harvard Law School, articulated not so much a new
philosophy of legal education as a new methodology. Aristotelian in his educational character, he saw the need to enunciate principles of law and to find
these in analytical exercises relating to cases--that is, written opinions-as these
were published by courts of distinction (notably appellate courts). He said that:
[The common] law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles
or doctrines . . . the growth [of which] is to be traced in the main through
a series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only, way of
mastering the doctrine effectively is by studying the cases in which it is
embodied.
Langdell was essentially an educational theorist but he had a fine sense of
relevance to learning experience and the law: he saw the need for abstraction
from the mass of law, to principles which could be carried over and applied to a
variety of legal situations. In effect, he enunciated the principle that learning in
one law condition or situation could be related to similar and other conditions
and situations by searching for and knowing appropriate principles. He also
recognized, perhaps more intuitively than consciously, that effective learning and
professional skill require mental exercise. Langdellian exercises were mostly
historical analysis. Those of his teaching colleague, Ames, were characteristically
in Aristotelian logical analysis. The good student at Harvard inevitably became
proficient in dialectics and forensics. The cathedral of learning or-as Langdell
himself, Jerome Frank, and others have put it-the laboratory of learning,
became the library. The classroom was a mere adjunct. "The library is to us
what the laboratory is to the chemist or the physicist and what the museum is to
the naturalist," Langdell said. That seemed ironic to Frank, and seems ironic
today, but Langdell's intent was to make the learning of law as close to the
practice of law as good educational principles would allow.
The dominant objects of American legal education, then and now, and
looking always to Harvard, are analysis and argument.
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III. The Law Schools and the Bar-Narrowness in Legal Education
The Langdellian approach and the Ames application of the "case method"
is the tradition of legal education that remains with us today, a century later, in
spirit and substance. The citadel of legal education has remained largely immune to the currents of intellectual and social development which have swept
American and Western society in the past 100 years. John Dewey and Sigmund
Freud are little noted and their influences, though large in the society around us,
have barely distracted the legal education enterprise. A near century of selfconsciousness and struggle for personal and social self-improvement has barely
touched legal education, and only then because the clamor for better lawyers
sometimes has implied the need for better legal education. The age of science
had stimulated a few intellectual eccentrics in law school, who contemplated
methods that would make law more scientific, or possibly make of law a science,
but these experiments left no visible mark. They were tolerated as diseases unlikely to be contagious. If anything, the ineffectiveness of the eccentrics seemed
to confirm the view emanating over the years from Harvard that legal education,
at least fundamentally, could not be improved upon.
It is the lack of humanism, more than the lack of technique, which shames
legal education. By today's standards of psychological and educational sophistication, and given the urgency of current ethical dilemmas, the learning of law is
a retarded enterprise. First, and most of all, the twentieth century allows us to see
that it is students who learn, that the learning of law is an activity for people.
Learning derived from narrow intellectual drill is not sufficient. The cultivation
of emotional and moral sensitivities, along with intellectual development, is the
mark of thorough professional preparation for the lawyer. Without the cultivation of self-consciousness and people-consciousness, as well as law consciousness,
preparation for the practice of law becomes sterile and, inevitably, the practice
itself tends to become sterile. Lawyers are often insensitive to the society they
purport to serve. (Could it be, even, that personal injustice is perpetratedby law
and lawyers where these sensing mechanisms are not developed? Maybe lawyers
do not appreciate as well as they should where personal injustice exists and how
best to deal with it.)
The stodgy educational enterprise of law is one barrier to ameliorative
professional development. Another cooperative barrier is in the hallowed traditions and the insular, self-protective character of the organized bar itself.
Legal education trains its own allies. The Bar, controlling the instruments of
power which protect and regulate the legal profession, has enunciated the requirements for acceptable legal education. Supported by court and statute it
has jurisdiction over who is acceptable for the practice of law. In the exercise of
this power, the organized and unitary Bar is a conserving and conservative
force. With less consciousness than most legal educators of what is required to
develop professional attitudes and capacities, the Bar, through its authority to
accredit and disaccredit law schools, has focused on residence, length-of-study,
and implicit subject matter requirements for learning and certification. The
requisite subjects, also reflected in demands of bar examinations, are essentially
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traditional categories of law for which there is presumed to be adequate casebook
and textbook instruction and preparation. There is also recognition of something
called an attitude of "professional responsibility" and for this a measure of "good
moral character" has been developed. The "measure" is often one or two or
three recommendations as to "character" from those asked by applicants to the
bar to support their candidacy, and in a few states, separate examinations on the
American Bar Association's Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.
In times of mounting criticism of lawyers and, implicitly, the preparation of
lawyers, the inclination of the organized bar is to seek more stringency in legal
education. It leans on the legal education enterprise by specifying more detailed
or specific course requirements. The benign function of overseeing legal education translates itself into a greater concern with the planning and administration
of the law school curriculum. Because the organized bar has a vested interest in
the maintenance of the practice of law in a form and manner that are comfortable, safe, and familiar, almost all change-and most innovation-in educational
policies and practice are disfavored. There is little room for success in experiments with new means of professionalizing lawyers, especially since most curricula are elective and students are quick to learn that it is bar authorities rather
than academic authorities that must ultimately be satisfied. The student seeks
bar-related and bar-significant courses. He cannot afford to pursue legal education as an adventure in learning, and an opportunity for self-learning, because
there appears to him to be no tangible reward or secure professional preparation
in these choices. In a literary image cherished by law professors, the law student
is between the Scylla of the organized bar and the Charybdis of his law school.
IV. The Educational Influence of American Legal Realists
The sameness and monolithic structure of American legal education affords
only a very limited possibility for freely undertaken experiment and modification.
It is the exceptional law professor, journeying outside the mainstream, who
catches a novel current and rides it. Where some degree of variation has occurred it has been, historically, in response to intellectual ferment concerning the
law and not because of new insight into educational philosophy and method.
One notable experiment was that generated by the American legal realists in
the second, third, and fourth decades of the twentieth century. Essentially a
critical movement, legal realism stressed the distinction between the lofty purport
of law and its highly palpable operation. The crudities of the judicial process,
especially at a time when the examples of a scientifically gained knowledge and
scientific method were in the ascendancy, created a wave of dissatisfaction with
conceptual law. At the intellectual centers of Yale and Columbia, curious minds
were at work devising more scientific legal practice. Underhill Moore copied
the experimental method of an embryonic scientific psychology to show that
legal sanctions could (should) be based on the experimental study of social
behavior. He and his students observed the traffic parking patterns and sanctioning procedures in New Haven and analyzed the association between the two.
Robert Hutchins, then the dean of the Yale Law School, working with
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Donald Slesinger of Yale and Mortimer Adler and Herbert Wechsler at
Columbia, sought to infuse the rules of evidence with behavioral criteria drawn
from the experimental study of psychologists. Others, such as Jerome Michael
and Herbert Wechsler, both at Columbia, sought to consider and teach law,
notably criminal law, as responsive behavior in a social context. The culmination
of efforts to infuse law with the methods and findings of the social sciences occurred in the now largely forgotten Johns Hopkins experiment, notably under
the direction of Walter Wheeler Cook. The commitment of this new law study
venture was to the idea that law could and should be scientific, that it was a
science in its own right.
The introduction of radical thinking and new perspectives to the understanding of law, at least in intellectual circles, likely contributed a new excitement
to the learning of law, at least at Yale and Columbia, in the twenties and thirties.
Inquiring and challenging minds are infectious to learning, especially when they
invite and direct efforts to investigate existing assumptions, and to extend knowledge. The climate of learning is likely to be replete with curiosity, expectation,
and drive. Commitment to a larger search for justice intensifies interest and
dedication. It is a sort of aphrodisiac to learning.
The buoyant expectations of the legal realists failed and their new educational enthusiasm fizzled. The dreariness and sameness of legal education recurred, or remained, in most places. In retrospect, the novelties of American
legal realism were an incomplete educational experiment. These were merely
a by-product of a more fundamental assault on the methodology of judicial
decision, implicating legal education because most of the realists were law
teachers and because, thanks to Langdell and Ames, judicial decision was still
the stuff of legal education. But the educational interest in legal realism was eccentric in most cases, and the substance and procedure of law learning remained
unchanged. Conceptualism prevailed, though perhaps concern for justice was
noted more frequently than it had been. Still remote from consciousness was
the view that law, or law learning, dealt intimately with human beings. The
humane aspects of legal instruction and legal ministration were eclipsed, if they
ever shone at all, by the emphasis on the need to learn law and by the teacher's
single-minded concern for legalities and the student's single-minded concern for
legalism. Legal education remained no more than a library of doctrine and
theory about law-to be assimilated at all costs.
One of the more outspoken and irrepressible legal realists, Jerome Frank,
flayed at the gaps he perceived-not only between the theory and practice of
law, but also between legal education and professional legal experience. He was
a humanist seeking to close the distance between law and intimate human
experience, an advocate of "clinical lawyer schools." Frank said that law schools
ought to more nearly prepare students for the practice of law by exposing them
to experience and association with lawyers in practice. An advocate more than
an educator in the formal sense, Frank objected to legal education in the
Langdellian tradition which was then, and is now, pervasive. In Frank's view,
it was like "prospective dog-breeders who never see anything but stuffed dogs."
His brief espoused the spirit that sought to make law, in all of its aspects, more
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sensitive to actual experience and more humane. He wanted students to learn
from the events and experiences that were the subject of litigation, not from the
"tail end of cases," in which a few essential facts were stipulated for the sake of
legal discussion in appellate courts. He wanted teachers to speak from legal field
experience, at least five years of it. He decried the conceptualism of law teachers
who eschewed concern with the social experience and social context in which law
occurred. He proposed, as further antidote to law teaching practice, that each
law school have its own "live" clinic. He wanted students to become familiar
with raw experience through exposure to fact-finding and to an analysis of facts
which he did not find in the tower of concepts students climbed on in law school.
V. Clinical Legal Education and Other Recent Innovations
Jerome Frank's advocacy was a voice in the wilderness for nearly 40 years
until, recently, "clinical legal education" acquired a small foothold in the universal and traditional sancta of law learning. Beginning in the late sixties, and
facilitated by the philanthropy of the Ford Foundation, many law schools undertook small programs of student exposure to the legal contexts of office, courtroom, and people. Most students now spend time in programs of this sort at some
time during the course of their professional legal education. They seek to learn
there how to interview clients, write briefs, file motions, and even represent
clients in court. They are exposed to real clients in live situations and experience
firsthand the anguish, uncertainty and need that characterize consultation with
live persons.
It is precise, though, to say that clinical legal experience, with very limited
exception, is permitted and tolerated in legal education as a peripheral enterprise. It is at most adjunctive to the traditional core of legal training and is
afforded limited credibility (in fact, limited credit) toward educational completion. This tenuous commitment to clinical legal education may reflect a feeling
that clinical work lacks intellectual character. As Professor Edmund Kitch of
the University of Chicago Law School observes, in prefacing the report of a
conference on the subject, "the central argument for clinical education is compelling but deceptive in its simplicity." Clinical education is seen to be practice
without theory, the antithesis of a traditional reliance on and bias for concepts
in learning law. It has, in any case, yet to establish that it is self-supporting, or
that it will be supported, even in its current, limited manifestation, once its philanthropic underwriting disappears.
Innovation in legal education comes hard, is limited in scope and permission, and generally dies young. Temperament and environment appear inimical.
Nonetheless, there is an increasing consciousness among law teachers that they
should reflect to students, in tangible ways, the facet that law is a force in society
and not merely an event in a time and place measured by legal history, or a
subject whose essence is dialectical inquiry. There has come to be, for example, a
tradition of searching for the policy of law at Yale Law School, first suggested
by the resident legal realists and then given a fuller theoretical treatment by the
conjoining efforts of the legal scholar Myres McDougal, and the political
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scientist Harold Lasswell. The essentials of legal education remain, in the work
of McDougal and Lasswell, in conceptualism, but there is elaborate empirical
inquiry and the framework of inquiry is, for them, characteristically broader
than the most recent decisions of appellate courts or prescriptions of legislatures.
In other examples, the University of Denver and Northeastern University
law schools show an almost unique commitment to clinical legal education in
the larger diversity and broader compass of their programs of clinical experience
for students. Student experience more nearly approaches the traditions of apprenticeship in those schools, with both practitioners and pedagogues serving
as mentors. A commitment to clinical legal education as an instrument for social
consciousness and social change characterizes the new Antioch Law School in
Washington, D.C. There advocacy of social reform, especially in regard to the
interests of minority groups, is paramount. The Stanford University School of
Law, reflecting indirectly influences from Willard Hurst and others, who regard
law in terms of its social and historical development, has broadened the scope
if not the methodology of legal education to serve a variety of social functions.
There even appears to be at Stanford a stronger commitment to infusing law
learning with systematic social inquiry as a means for determining impact and
direction in the law. We doubtlessly neglect similar examples. But, even considering what we neglect, there is not in any of these developments, or all of them,
a clear trend. They seem mostly to be evidence of restlessness.
The mainstream of legal education is substantially unaffected and unchanged since the ingenuity of Langdell transformed the educational enterprise
in 1871. Even the current experiments in law learning mentioned in the last
paragraph appear to have a temporal quality that belies, or at least as yet fails to
establish, the substance and permanence of discrete novelty in legal education.
This state of affairs is remarkable when seen in the perspective of (1) humanistic
consciousness since Sigmund Freud and William James and the advent of
psychological awareness and self-consciousness as a commonplace experience;
(2) developments in educational theory and method first stimulated by John
Dewey and pervading in some measure nearly all of American education; and
(3) the development of science and scientific method as the instrument for refinements in knowledge and as a means of more nearly approximating and communicating truth. These, along with the dramatic impact of Marxian economics,
are the dominant intellectual and social events of the past century. They have
left an indelible mark on consciousness and experience. They have doubtlessly
affected the law, but not--or at least not very much-legal education.
VI. "Learning the Law" and "Thinking Like a Lawyer"-Limtations
in Legal Education
This is benign neglect indeed. It suggests the presence of palpable attitudes
about human experience and an absence of fully formed knowledge about the
learning process as ways to account for the lack of educational growth and
maturation in law schools. To begin with, it is our premise (our hypothesis
and our empirical conclusion) that the learning of law, more than the practice of
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law, is task-oriented rather than person-oriented. Law students, their teachers,
and many lawyers are infused with the idea that the subject matter of law is
textual. They insist that this is so, whether it is or not. Their relation to clients
is secondary. "Learning the law" and "thinking like a lawyer" are primary.
Consultative and counseling relationships are incidental occurrences; they happen as a matter of course. This is a remarkable disposition if, in fact, the lawyer
is concerned with justice. It invites the inquirer to guess that it is justice in the
abstract, or justice as the product of law, rather than a personal sense of justice,
that occupies the lawyer. It may be, too, that lawyers are too busy in the "administration of justice" to take much notice of their personal impact on clients.
The study of law, insofar as it is task-oriented and fails to realize or conceptualize
human experience, helps to insulate the student and practitioner from real
people and from their experiences.
We believe that the context of learning law is intellectually competitive and
emotionally desensitized. The impact of this emotional climate and learning
environment blunts human sensibility. The disposition to help clients, as distinguished from finding and implementing the law for clients, is reduced. There
is a larger reward for aggression than for empathy. The young lawyer is rewarded for heeding his traditional image of fighter and champion of causes. If
he purports to counsel clients it is mostly in a narrow, paternal way; he gives
advice but fails to employ mutual sensibilities that are the essence of a shared
and supportive human relationship. This relationship, we think, is often the
real goal and basic need of the client in search of counsel.
The structure of law learning is, it seems to us, singularly narrow. It is
incredibly opaque in its contempt for good learning principles. Cases are added
on to cases to cover legal concepts in a given subject matter of law (something
Langdell in proposing a few cases as storehouses of principle did not foresee).
Statutes and administrative holdings are often, now, engrafted onto the process.
Content is given the appearance of modification, and modernization, by the
occasional introduction or reorganization of course labels. What is lacking is
a sense, and a knowledge, that learning is sequential; it generally moves from
simpler to more difficult inquiry and application. Most of the difficult stuff in
law school is taught in the first year. Lacking, too, is the recognition that adequate but not excessive reinforcement, support, and encouragement are economical learning experience and essential for good retention. There is a further
failure to note that it is essential and transferable principles that form the
scaffolding on which is engrafted details and applications. Thus one learns, or
should learn, how to function mentally in a sea of detail more than one seeks
to learn the mass of detail itself. The whole concept of instruction as a formal
discipline is ignored. Few law teachers know of the contributions of such distinguished educational and psychological theorists of the learning experience as
Jerome Bruner and Jean Piaget. Law teachers, even when they innovate, "fly
by the seat of their pants." Lifetimes of experimental and theoretical inquiry in
the learning and educational process, not to mention inquiry into the teaching
and learning experience over several generations, do not reach across the seminary wall created by the insular and often self-satisfied conceptualism of law
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schools.
The method(s) of legal instruction are equally as narrow, though better
defined, than the structure of learning material. Traditional law school dialogue
is characteristically and repetitively in the dialectical mode, where it is inquiry
rather than information that is generated. There is a honing of oral and analytical skills to the exclusion of other skills essential to professional competence.
The rationale is that "thinking like a lawyer" (and talking like a lawyer) is all
that counts; other skills will be acquired by extension. There may be some dilution of this exclusive mode of instruction, and it may be attended with less vitriol
than in the past. There are even a few inventive law teachers who try new
teaching procedures, mostly as contrast to their more practiced habits. However,
there is little inclination and probably limited competence to distinguish different teaching-learning methods for different learning purposes. Examples
would include cooperative, group learning-and-doing experiences; individual
programmed instruction using modem electronic aids; demonstrative and participant learning as in role playing; empirical inquiry that generates curiosity and
findings about experiences; and directed or supervised self-observation and individual learning. These are now occasional and exceptional methods of instruction in law school. It is as though there is neither time nor tolerance for
teaching and learning methods that are presumed to offer a diminished intellectual content, and even that assumes an awareness that these methods exist.
Finally, and most critically, legal education seems to lack the consciousness
that learning is an intimate personal and psychological experience. The accumulated clinical insight of generations of psychological, psychoanalytic, and

psychiatric experience illuminates as well as complicates our understanding of
human behavior, but it is lost on those who tune themselves out, who protect
themselves from involvement with other persons. Tuning out on the personal
experiences of students in learning is a doubtful luxury that, in any event,
teachers can ill afford. The failure to accord dignity and sensitivity to students

as individuals and as learners compounds the learning task. It frustrates learning because it does not recognize the importance of motivating and supporting
the student. The student has intrinsic mechanisms which spawn interest and
curiosity, and fear and doubt, and concern and decency. The teacher plays on
these dispositions and tendencies; in doing so he helps or harms the student,
both as a person and as a learner. He sets a precedent, knowingly or not, for
the young lawyer's professional behavior by the sensitivity or insensitivity he
shows in the critical human relationship of education. He has these influences
whether he realizes it or not; his failure to recognize them probably makes his
influence worse.
VII. The Neglected Students and Studies of LearningBruner, Piaget and Others
On a more positive note, it is instructive, we think, to mention here some
of the ideas and concepts of education that law teachers might learn from Bruner
and Piaget. They are seminal figures who increase our consciousness that ed-
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ucational end values are served by an educational process which it behooves law
teachers to understand. Bruner evolved a theory of instruction which "is in
effect a theory of how growth and development are assisted by diverse means."
He set about to inquire into the origins of human cognitive activity, that activity
which includes problem solving, conceptualizing, thinking and perceptual
recognition. He also concerned himself with a theory of knowledge, a theory
that recognizes education as social invention: "Each generation must define
afresh the nature, direction, and aims of education."
Through this inquisitorial process Bruner developed a theory of instruction
with four cardinal elements. One element concerns itself with the kinds of experience that will generate or reinforce curiosity and interest in the learner.
Translated, it may ask: What approaches to law, what experiences in law, are
likely to stimulate the interest of the student in how law works and how to use

it or deal with it? To some extent, the student, by expressing a preference to
learn law, ostensibly brings to learning his own patterning of law-related interests,
but we find that most law students have very little exposure to law, knowledge
of how it operates or conception of law prior to law study. The experience of
law that the student receives in law school, be it ethical, social, psychological,
economic, or historical, is usually the first experience of law he has. It clearly
directs, or misdirects, his curiosity and interest.
Bruner's second element concerns the structuring of knowledge in a given
field. The value of structure is in its ability to "simplify information, generate
new propositions and increase the manipulability of a body of knowledge." To
do so in law, and still maintain relevance for the humanistic and social serving
purposes of law, the structure of teaching and learning requires that person,
experience, and law all be formulated adequately and in relation to one another.

There has to be an appropriate and consistent way to deal with the constancies
and change that characterize not only law but also human beings in diverse
settings. In effect, law is relational, and it is the motivations and purposes, and
needs and dispositions, in relation to others, which characterize the behavior of
people. Law cannot be merely a body of principles attached to history-even
legal history-which is detached from immediate experience. Bruner further
emphasizes that there must be a transferable character to learning, "the continual broadening and deepening of knowledge in terms of basic and general
ideas." Learning should be both pleasurable and utilitarian; it should give the
learner a means to deal with the present and also to anticipate how to deal with
the future.
A third element focuses on the sequence of instruction. It recognizes that
there are methods of learning and teaching for individuals and subjects. These
methods foster in the learner a sense of organization, direction, and pacing in the
learning experience. Learning may be intuitive or analytical, incremental or
whole; but it is mostly progressive. Law learning should be the development of

empathy and intuition, of analysis and understanding, and of belief and preference, through measures and means that carefully assess all available human and
legal material for its learning potential. Law learning could be, in effect, experimentation with different kinds and styles of learning for different subjects
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and for different people.
A fourth element identified by Bruner is the system of paced rewards and
punishments that act to stimulate and direct the learning experience. Here one
is more directly dealing with the student and what makes him or her responsive.
An awareness of the law student as human being contributes to empathy and
understanding so that one can best judge, for instance, whether to use tutorial
methods; whether to use examinations; whether to develop formal or informal
modes of instruction; and whether to be supportive or demanding in teaching.
This "reinforcement" factor also relates to how many different ways a given
set of materials should be presented and how often and in what ways it should be
repeated.
Students, as Bruner notes, have predispositions to learn based on culture
and motive. The student is not an instrument but a human being. Different
kinds of student-instructor relationships-authoritarian, noncontrolling, detached, warm, and engaged-are all relevant to learning. Each in its way jogs
learning capacity. Knowledge may be characterized by the mode in which it is
represented as well as by its content. And here one may speak of instructional
style and focus on the uses of language, whether informative, argumentative,
artistic, or scientific. Knowledge involves an economy in knowing and in learning
which should lead teachers to avoid pedantry, fatuity, and irrelevance. There
are distinctions in importance. It is not enough that one case or set of principles
merely add to another. Finally, knowledge is power. Clear comprehension and
skillful use provide the means for clarification, implementation, and change in
the circumstances in which people live. Persons and knowledge have many different dimensions, in law as elsewhere, and an understanding of these dimensions
is clearly a condition for how to teach law well, and for how to learn it without
excessive pain.
Bruner also speaks of "coping and defending" as mechanisms by which a
person comes to terms with and struggles with a task or situation he or she must
face. Students cope by seeking to meet the requirements and conditions of a
learning situation without having the integrity of their personhood compromised
or "wiped out." They defend against encroachments-and these can be encroachments from instructors, from the learning experience, or from the demands
of topic or teacher-that seem to offend or threaten a sense of well-being and
offer less than enough communication. Personal relationship-some source of
understanding of the person-is important in appreciating the possibilities for
learning and the limitations which make learning unlikely.
Piaget teaches teachers about the intrinsic characteristics of individual
mental and social development. From him we learn, we should know, that there
is both communality and uniqueness in the ways in which individual thinking
and conceptual capacity develop. Piaget, interestingly, is also a pioneer in inquiry about the development of moral attitudes and a sense of justice in children
-and from him we can derive much of value about the psychological impacts of
law in operation.
Approximating Piaget's theory, thinking evolves in stages, from a sensing
experience to an operational or more practical experience, to an abstract, con-
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ceptualizing experience. Piaget explores the foundations in each stage of thinking
that prepare the individual to use a larger or broader intelligence in the next
stage. He investigates the role of language, its semantic components, and the
importance of a sustained motivation to inquire as a basis for more developed
thinking ability. He also reflects on creative thinking, social thinking, and other
kinds of thinking. Piaget may be less relevant for direct application to instruction about law than Bruner but his unified theory of human mental development
and function is a desirable requisite for understanding the nature of the subject
(student) and how to proceed in the instructional process. Piaget discourses on
"the thinking man"and that, after all, is a primary concern even in the most
conventional approach to legal education.
There are others, renowned educators, whose insights about the educational
process are instructive, if one cares to notice. Dr. James Conant speaks of two
modes of thinking, the empirical-inductive and the theoretical-deductive: "Both
modes of thought have their dangers... above all, intellectual freedom requires
a tolerance of the activities of the proponents of one mode by the other."
Professor Israel Scheffler identifies three philosophical modes of teaching, the
"impression model" based on Locke's idea that the teacher is inscribing on a
"white paper, void of all characteristics"; the "insight model," in which the instructor helps to create a "vision"' and the student provides the details; and the
"rule model," after Kant, in which reason is the arbiter of what is right. Professor David Ausubel, incorporating insights from the empirical inquiries of many
students of the teaching and learning process, including his own, notes that
some students need to affiliate (learning is important if it gives acceptance); some
need ego enhancement (learning helps to increase one's status among others);
some need dependence (they prefer to be spoon-fed and will be accurate reflectors of existing practice) ; and some need independence (they need to establish
their own competences in terms that provide separate identity).
These and other conceptions and findings illuminate the educational process.
However, none of the contributions from leading educational thinkers and
researchers is conclusive as to the "right" way to learn, to think, or to teach. As
is common in psychology-and this may be a clue to why law teachers find
psychology frustrating-each of these notable theorists has a point of view, a
methodological insight or some specific information that illuminates the educational process. To most lawyers and legal educators, discourse on educational
theory as a means to learning how to teach, and how to understand professionalization, is esoterica. It is seen as "noise," as verbal obscurantism; it hardly seems
worthwhile. This is the sort of know-nothingism which lawyers rightfully condemn elsewhere. It may help explain why legal education is inert. It may account for the dearth of inquiry and experiment among law teachers.
The clearest message is that education, in this instance legal education, is
a complex pedogogical process. It should consciously rejoice in social philosophy,
methodology, and an exquisite consciousness of teachers and students as varieties
of human beings. Anything less is simply inadequate to the dignity of the enterprise.
Learning the law is, now, we believe, too primitive an experience. It lacks
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mental, moral, emotional, and social development and therefore does not serve
the best interests of society or, for that matter, the best interests of the legal profession. It lacks humanistic concern, probably because it lacks the appropriate
means and conditions which would ameliorate and improve the learning experience. To prove our point we have set about to demonstrate empirically
failures in the making of lawyers. Our intent is to stimulate an interest in
significant change in legal education, a change in the direction of greater humanism, and greater contact with interpersonal and social reality.
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